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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal is brought pursuant to the provisions of Article 
VIII, Sections 3 and 5 of the Utah Constitution and pursuant to 
Rules 3 and 4 of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
Plaintiff appeals from the Third Judicial District Court's entry 
of Judgment in favor of Respondent. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, AND RULES. 
None 
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ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW* 
Did the trial court err when it entered judgment that 
plaintiff's claims for bodily injury were barred by accord and 
satisfaction? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of Case 
On November 9, 1985 Kelly Howard was injured in a two 
car automobile collision in which Robert E. Buhler was the driver 
of the other vehicle. After various contacts and communications 
between Howard and the insurance adjustor for Buhler's insurance 
carrier Howard brought suit for personal injuries and other 
claims. Buhler asserted, among other defenses, the affirmative 
defense of accord and satisfaction (RIO). 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
The case was tried to the Court without a jury on June 
7 and 8, 1988. At the conclusion of the trial the Court 
requested that Howard respond to Buhler7s Trial Memorandum 
Respecting Accord and Satisfaction Defense dated June 7, 1988 
(R245-25). Howard filed his response on June 15, 1988 (R180-
195). On June 17, 1988 Buhler filed his Defendant's Reply to 
Plaintiff's Trial Memorandum Respecting Accord and Satisfaction 
(R196-207). On September 21, 1988 the Honorable James S. Sawaya 
filed a Memorandum Decision in favor of Buhler (R242,243). On 
*Another issue may be presented pursuant to Rule 2 R.Ut. App. Ct. 
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October 13, 1988 the judgment appealed from was entered (R288-
290). On November 4, 1988 Howard filed his Notice of Appeal 
(R303). 
C. Statement of Facts 
In the first contact that Howard had with Ms. Kirchoff 
on November 12, 1985, the adjustor for Buhler's insurance 
carrier, Howard gave her a statement of the accident Howard told 
her then that he had "spoke with an attorney" (T104), which she 
recorded (T43,95,104). Thereafter on January 24, 1986 Kirchoff 
sent Howard a release form to settle the claim for $2,844 
(T43,96). She advised Howard that "When I received that back by 
return mail, I would forward a check" (T97). The release was 
never signed and returned (T98,99). On May 29, 1986 Howard 
consulted with his present counsel and then learned he could 
obtain legal service on a contingent fee basis without charge on 
the sum the insurance carrier was willing to pay if their offer 
was in writing (Ex.43). On July 8, 1986, after Howard decided to 
go into a lighter line of work as recommended by his doctor and 
take a computer course costing $3,700 to qualify him for computer 
work, Kirchoff made a settlement offer of $8,000 (T99, Ex.13). 
In doing so she "discussed the release that I would need, the 
computer school contract for $3,700. I would forward a release. 
He would return it by mail, sign the release, have it notarized. 
Upon receipt of the release in our office, I would forward him a 
check and conclude the matter." (T102) On August 6, 1986 
Kirchoff sent Howard a letter requesting that he send the release 
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(T102, Ex.12). On August 7, 1986 he called his attorney and 
advised that written proof of an $8,000 insurance company was 
being sent to him (Ex.44). A contingent fee, contract excluding 
$8,000 was signed by Howard August 18, 1986 (Ex.44). It was 
never signed (Ex.13). Buhler was served with summons in this 
suit on October 9, 1986 (T110). Kirchoff never told him before 
that date that this case had been settled (T110). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court erred in determining that Howard accepted 
the offer of $8,000 rather than only indicating that at that time 
he was "ready to settle" since the quoted words were the only 
facts to which Buhler's adjustor testified to regarding his 
comments and especially in view of his not signing and returning 
two release forms that the adjustor said he'd have to sign before 
she paid him. 
The preponderance of the evidence is there was no accord. 
In any event this Court should require the higher degree of proof 
of clear and convincing evidence to find an accord in settling 
insurance claims. 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A FINDING OF 
ORAL ACCEPTANCE OF AN $8,000 OFFER AND THE OFFER WAS CONDITIONAL 
UPON SIGNING OF A WRITTEN RELEASE WHICH WAS NEVER SIGNED. 
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In Paragraph No. 2 of a mixture of facts and conclusions 
which were not separated (R289) the Court states that "plaintiff 
accepted the settlement figure of $8,000 on July 8, 1986." There 
is no evidence to support any finding of fact to justify such a 
conclusion of law. In only one part of the record does Buhler's 
witness on this point testify as to what Howard said on that 
date. Her quote as to his statement was "I am ready." (T181) At 
that point in time he had consulted with counsel and he was 
"ready", ready to either settle the case or to go to court if the 
settlement offered was not what the claim was worth. He did not 
have the benefit of his counsel's evaluation of an $8,000 offer 
then and he obviously intended to obtain it before making his 
decision (Ex.43,44). 
Although Buhler had the burden of proof on this issue he did 
not present any proof as to what was actually said in the form of 
a telephone recording, even though the adjustor involved 
previously recorded their initial call concerning the facts of 
the case. 
The adjustor had made it clear to Howard that he had to sign 
the release form she sent him before he could be paid. He was 
justified in relying on her representation in that regard and 
particularly since there was no effort to hold him to a prior 
offer of $2,844 which the adjustor claimed was also accepted by 
him (T105). The evidence was in conflict as to whether Howard 
told Kirchoff that he was going to consult an attorney before he 
settled the case (T49 and T105). Jay Wood corroborated Howard's 
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testimony on this point (T121,122). 
Much was made at trial of Exhibit 14 a statement Jay Wood 
sent to Kirchoff at Howard's request on August 8, 1986 which 
reads as follows: 
"Enclosed is the contract from the school which I 
am attending (Mountainwest College). 
Please send me my release form for $8,000.00 on 
which we agreed." 
There is no doubt from the evidence that Kirchoff needed a 
copy of the computer school contract before she would be able to 
settle and that Howard needed a written offer of settlement 
before his attorney would make an exclusion from his contingent 
fee contract if the offer were inadequate. This need for an 
exchange is what that note was all about. 
The most telling proof that there was no acceptance by 
Howard of the $8,000 telephone offer on July 8, 1986 was 
Kirchoffs letter of August 6, 1986 in which she states, inter 
alia, "If you are still interested in settling vour claim, please 
provide American Concept with a copy of your education contract 
so that we may conclude this matter" (Ex.12)(underscoring added). 
The preponderance of the evidence is against an accord and 
satisfaction for the following reasons: 
1. No release was signed in this case although Kirchoff 
told Howard that would be required before he could be paid. 
(Ex.13, T <a>) 
2s Howard and Kirchoff had previously discussed settlement 
at a different figure and Kirchoff claimed they had reached 
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accord but the formal release was not signed and Kirchoff did not 
seek to enforce it (thus leading Howard to believe that there 
would not be an enforceable settlement until the formal release 
had been signed). (196,97) 
3. Plaintiff consulted with counsel on May 29, 1986 and 
knew he could pursue any claim that was not deemed fair by his 
attorney without paying a fee on the sum offered in writing. 
(Ex.43) 
4. No recording was made of the remarks of the claimant 
although the adjustor had previously made a recording of the 
claimants oral statements and claimant knew that. (T104 and 
absence of proof of recording "settlement discussion.) 
5. Kirchoff did not testify that plaintiff actually agreed 
to settle his claims for $.8,000.00 (can't cite to the negative). 
6. Kirchoff did not follow up the phone conference of July 
8, 1986 in which she claims plaintiff agreed to settle for 
$8,000.00 with any confirming letter or other documentation sent 
at that time. (Id.) 
7. On August 6, 1986 Kirchoff wrote plaintiff in pertinent 
part as follows: "Jf you are still interested in settling your 
claim, please provide American Concept with a copy of your 
education contract so we may conclude this matter." 
(underscoring added)(Ex.12) 
8. Kirchoff had not followed up on the above letter by the 
time Buhler was served with process in this suit which occurred 
on the 9th day of October, 1986 and she never told me before then 
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that she'd settled the case. 
In the court below Buhler's counsel urged the Court to find 
an accord on the facts of this case by following the four 
following precedents: 
(1) Sucrarhouse Finance Co. v. Anderson, 610 P2d 1369 
(Utah 1980). 
(2) Jaramillo v. Farmers Insurance Group, 669 P2d 1231 
(Utah 1983). 
(3) Allen v. Bissinaer & Co., 219 P539 (Utah 1923). 
(4) Lawrence Construction Co. v. Holmquist, 642 P2d 
382. 
As for (1) , deals almost entirely with the question of 
"consideration," that being the fourth element it listed as being 
essential to an Accord and Satisfaction (element 3 being "assent 
or a meeting of minds," which is the critical element on the 
instant case—was stated as being present there and thus not 
discussed. 
As for (2), the facts were not in dispute. The facts there 
were stipulated to. In a three to two decision the majority 
found that there* was a conflict between the stipulation of facts 
and the release in evidence and held that the former was 
controlling and that a prior precedent of that Court would not 
alter the legal effect of the parties agreement to settle a case 
contrary to that precedent (the Ivie case which held that Utah's 
no fault law does not confer on a no-fault insurer the right of 
subrogation to funds received by its insured in a subsequent 
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action against the tort feasor. 
As for (3), the accord was based on correspondence and the 
Court said "there is no substantial conflict in the evidence, the 
most important part of which consists of written communications 
between the parties." This is in sharp contrast with the case at 
bar where the critical communications are oral rather than in 
writing and the testimony is diametrically opposed as to the 
substance of the phone conversations in question. 
As for (4), the issue was whether the settlement was subject 
to certain conditions. There the party held to an oral accord 
actually signed the Stipulation (but three days after the stated 
deadline) and the Court noted (P.383) that "neither the letter 
nor the Stipulation specifically states that the settlement was 
contingent on those conditions." Although an oral accord was 
there enforced there was no dispute as to what was said in the 
prior oral agreement. In the instant case there is no proof at 
all as to what Howard said (disregarding his own testimony at 
trial said the evidence must be reviewed in the light most 
favorable to the prevailing party) only the adjustor's conclusion 
that he had accepted. 
None of the foregoing cases hold or even imply that one 
party stating he is "ready to settle" is equivalent to saying "I 
accept your offer of $8,000" or words to that effect. Thus, this 
case is one of initial impression and one likely to lower the 
case adjustors henceforth take to be sure a settlement is a 
settlement. 
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Buhler in his post-trial brief went outside the record in 
quoting from a deposition he took of Howard. This is quoted here 
to contrast the type of factual statement which would constitute 
an oral acceptance with the total absence of such evidence in 
this record. There Buhler's counsel asked this hypothetical 
question: 
"If you called her (Kirchoff) up and said 'I want 
to settle this case for $8,000/ and you discussed your 
school contract and she said 'okay, send me the school 
contract and I'll send you a release and we can 
conclude your claim' as you never said anything more to 
her, do you think it's reasonable for her to believe 
that you settled your claim?" (R199,200) Over 
objection Howard answered affirmatively. (R200) 
B. CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE SHOULD BE REQUIRED DEGREE 
OF PROOF IN INSURANCE CLAIMS TO PROVE AN ORAL ACCORD. 
Sound policy considerations impel caution in accepting 
an insurance adjustor's uncorroborated claim that the claimant 
settled his or her claim by an oral statement alone. Otherwise 
many claimants mciy never have "their day in court." A recent 
illustration of this Court applying such caution even to a 
stipulation recorded in a deposition to which a party's counsel 
agreed is the case of Brown v. Brown. 744 P2d 333 (Utah App. 
1987). Admittedly there is no stipulation involved in this case. 
Even so the principle of requiring evidence to be more than a 
preponderance should be required in those classes of cases where, 
as here, there could be an advantage unfairly taken without 
detection by the more experienced person such as an insurance 
adjustor. 
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No Utah case has ever decided whether the usual civil rule 
of preponderance applies in a case of an oral contract of 
settlement of an insurance claim. The imposition by this Court 
of the standard of clear and convincing evidence would have a 
salutary effect of requiring insurance companies to corroborate 
an oral acceptance by voice recordings, confirmation by other 
witnesses to the statements made, contemporaneous documentation 
or whatever satisfies the higher degree of proof. 
Our Supreme Court in the case of Holder v. Holder. 340 P.2d 
761 (Utah 1959) increased the required proof from clear and 
convincing to proof beyond a reasonable doubt in an annulment 
suit involving a question of paternity for comparable reasons of 
public policy to those Howard respectfully urges upon this Court 
to establish where no prior degree has yet been established, 
to settle this case for $8,000' and you discussed your school 
contract and she said 'okay, send me the school contract and I'll 
send you a release and we can conclude your claim' as you never 
said anything more to her, do you think its reasonable for her to 
believe that you settled your claim?" (R199, 200) 
In the reply memorandum Buhler's counsel states "When judged 
by an objective standard all conduct of Plaintiff indicated that 
he had settled this case with Ms. Kirchoff." Howard respectfully 
points out that his following conduct does not indicate he had 
settled this case with Ms. Kirchoff: (1) he consulted with an 
attorney in November 1985 whose name he could not recall to give 
Ms. Kirchoff at that time (T104), (2) He obtained a proposed 
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written contingent fee contract from his present attorney on May 
29, 1986 (Ex. 43), (3) On August 15, 1986 he signed a written 
contingent fee contract with his present counsel (Ex.44), (4) He 
did not sign, notcirize or return to the insurance adjustor the 
written release she said he's have to sign before she could pay 
him (R227), (5) He caused process to be served upon Buhler on 
October 8, 1986. (R5) 
In the same memorandum Buhler's counsel contends it is clear 
"even beyond a reasonable doubt that Plaintiff entered into a 
binding accord and satisfaction in this case." Accordingly, 
Buhler ought not to object to the application in this case of a 
lesser standard of "clear and convincing" in deciding whether an 
accord was proved. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence is insufficient to find an accord and, 
alternatively, the preponderance of the evidence is there was no 
accord. Alternatively to all of the above the Court should 
require as a matter of public policy that oral accords in 
insurance case should require proof that is clear and convincing 
rather than a mere preponderance. 
Howard respectfully requests this court to set aside the 
trial court's entry of judgment based on accord and satisfaction 
and remand the case to trial court for findings of fact, 
-12-
conclusions of lav and judgment as to issues of liability and 
damages. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 4th day of August, 1989. 
o~Q*±J\ 
Robert B. Hansen 
Attorney for Appellant 
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ROBERT E. BUHLER, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. C-86-7662 
The issues of this case were tried before the Court, sitting 
without a jury, commencing June 7, 1988. Robert B. Hansen, Esq. 
appeared on behalf of plaintiff, and Donald J. Purser, Esq. and 
M. Taylor Florence, Esq. of Purser, Okazaki and Berrett, appeared 
on behalf of the defendant. The matter was fully presented, 
argued and submitted, and the Court's decision thereon taken 
under advisement. The Court having now considered the evidence 
and arguments of counsel, together with written Memoranda 
submitted, now makes its decision and ruling thereon as follows: 
This is a personal injury case resulting from an automobile 
collision. The issues of liability, causation and damages were 
presented, as well as the defendant's affirmative defense of 
accord and satisfaction. It was stipulated by counsel and agreed 
by the Court that the issue of accord and satisfaction would be 
considered by the Court, and if defendant prevailed on that 
A-l 
HOWARD V. BUHLER PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
issue, that it would be dispositive of all other issues. Counsel 
has presented written Memoranda in support of their respective 
positions, and the Court has reviewed the same. 
The Court on the issue of the affirmative defense of accord 
and satisfaction finds, based upon the reasons and for the 
grounds stated in defendant's Memorandum, in favor of the 
defendant and rules that there was, in fact, an accord and 
satisfaction. Based upon this ruling, the Court determines that 
it is dispositive to all other issues of the case. 
Counsel for defendant is requested to prepare an appropriate 
Order and Findings consistent with the Court's ruling in this 
matter. 
Dated this 21st day of September^ 1988.: 
J3MFS S. SAWAYA 
DrOTRICT COURT JUDG^ j y r: r -
&f
~~' Deploy Clem 
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ROBERT E. BUHLER, 
Defendant. 
Q.\M3ao<& 
ORDER, FINDINGS AND 
ENTRY OF JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C86-7662 
(Judge James S. Sawaya) 
On June 7, 1988, the above-referenced parties regularly 
appeared before the Court at the trial of this matter. Robert 
B. Hansen, Esq. appeared on behalf of the Plaintiff, and Donald 
J. Purser, Esq. and M. Taylor Florence, Esq. of Purser, Okazaki & 
Berrett, P.C. appeared on behalf of the Defendant. Both parties 
proceeded to put on evidence in their respective cases in chief. 
The matter was fully presented, argued and submitted, and the 
courts decision thereon taken under advisement. 
The Court having considered the evidence and arguments of 
counsel, as well as the written memorandum submitted and all 
other documents of record in this case, thereafter submitted its 
memorandum decision dated September 21, 1988, finding in favor of 
Defendant on his affirmative defense of accord and satisfaction. 
In support of said decision, the following findings of fact are 
submitted: 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This is a personal injury case resulting from an 
automobile collision on November 9, 1985. The issues of 
liability, causation and damages were presented during the trial 
of this matter, as well as Defendant's affirmative defense of 
accord and satisfaction. It was stipulated by counsel and agreed 
by the Court that the issue of accord and satisfaction would be 
considered by the court, and if Defendant prevailed on the issue, 
that it would be dispositive of all other issues. 
2. The Court, on the issue of the affirmative defense of 
accord and satisfaction, finds that on July 8, 1986, Christine 
Kirchoff, on behalf of Defendant's liability insurer offered 
Plaintiff the amount of $8,000.00 as settlement of all claims 
arising out of the automobile accident at issue herein. On or 
about this same date, Plaintiff accepted the settlement figure in 
the amount of $8,000.00. Therefore, the parties expressed a 
mutual assent or meeting of the minds with regard to this 
settlement figure and a binding accord and satisfaction had been 
07166.mtf B-2 
achieved. 
3. The Court further finds that the settlement of the 
claims arising out of the automobile accident herein is the 
proper subject matter for an accord and satisfaction and that the 
parties thereto were competent to enter into such an agreement. 
Finally, the Court finds that there was valid consideration in 
the agreement to settle a disputed, uncertain cause of action 
sufficient to create a binding accord and satisfaction. 
4. The finding of a valid accord and satisfaction is 
dispositive of this case and the Court, therefore, need not reach 
the issues of liability, causation and/or damages with respect to 
the personal injury claims herein. 
5. Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that judgment be 
entered against Defendant, Robert E. Buhler, for the amount of 
$8,000.00. 
6. On file with the court and dated January 15, 1988, is a 
Notice of Offer of Judgment pursuant to Rule 68 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure in the amount of $16,000. In as much as the 
judgment finally obtained by Plaintiff in this case was 
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